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COMMON LAW KIDNAPPING
and a substantially increased risk of harm must be present the scope
of kidnapping behavior should be sharply reduced.
The discretion of prosecutors will also be restricted. In California
the prosecution was given considerable discretion once the necessity of
movement across a state or county line was removed. 3 Conversely,
this decision will limit the discretion of prosecutors. A district attorney
will find it far more difficult to use the threat of kidnapping conviction
as a means of extracting a guilty plea from a defendant. The defendant will be more eager to stand trial for offenses formerly connected
to kidnapping. Or, if he chooses to enter a guilty plea, his sentence
will be less severe.
In all probability, a kidnapping indictment will no longer permit escalation of penalties for the commission of an outrageous crime. Previously, where a trivial movement was sufficient, the public could pressure the prosecution into bringing a charge of kidnapping. If a defendant forced a group of children off the school playground and into a
classroom where he sexually assaulted them, he could have been tried
and convicted of kidnapping as well as assault. Since kidnapping probably carried the larger sentence, the net effect was a longer prison term
even if the sentences ran concurrently. However, where a substantial
asportation and a substantial risk of harm are necessary, an escalation
of penalties in this fashion should occur much less frequently. Penalties for crimes related to kidnapping may come to be regarded as inadequate deterrents to the more offensive types of conduct previously punished as kidnapping. 4 The decision in Dix could force the legislature
of North Carolina and of other states to reconsider the penalties which
are imposed for these offenses.

Crews v. Taylor: A Testator's Intent Can Be No
Less Than His Command?
In Crews v. Taylor,1 a recent case decided in the North Carolina
Court of Appeals, the court was presented with several important issues
concerning the testamentary intent and the "words of art" which a testator utilizes to demonstrate this intent. The provision of the instrument which preciptated the action before the court read
1. 21 N.C. App. 296, 204 S.E.2d

193

(1974).

33. Note, 35 S. CAL. L. REV. at 215.
34. Note, A Rationale of the Law of Kidnapping, 53 COLUM. L. Rav. 540, 558

(1953).
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FOURTH: I have advanced to my son, Rosco T. Taylor, Jr. at various times $5,000.00, and it is my desire that he account to my Estate
before he
for this amount without interest and that the
2 same -be paid
participates in the division of the real estate.
In another portion of the same will, the testator, Roscoe T. Taylor,
Sr., the father of the appellant, directed that the property in question
be actually partitioned among the parties to this proceeding, and that
each devisee receive a one-third undivided interest in the property in
fee simple. When the respondent-executor, another son of the testator, refused to allow the partition, the appellant initiated this action
to determine his legal status as a devisee under the will of his father.
The court held that the testator "intended" Item Fourth of the will
to be imperative and mandatory rather than precatory and therefore
only morally obliging; and that the appellant was required to re-pay the
sum of five-thousand dollars to the estate of his father. On its own
motion, the court entered judgment on the pleadings for the respondent-executor, Thomas Taylor.
Subsequently the North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed the
lower court judgment, not because the language in the will was precatory in nature, but because it found error in the lower court's acting
on its own motion to grant judgment to the respondent. 3 The appellate court stated that the critical issue before it was whether or not the
language used by the testator was precatory or legally imperative.
Nonetheless, the court subsequently avoided this issue and dismissed
it summarily. 4 The court noted that
[I]t is well-settled in this jurisdiction that the intent of the Testator
is the primary consideration in determining a patent ambiguity in a
will . . . A patent ambiguity arises from the use of the words "it is
my desire" as to whether these words are precatory or mandatory.
They are susceptible of either interpretation depending on the connowe
tation in which they are used. Under the circumstances of this will,
5
think it is clear that the testator intended them to be mandatory.
The case law both in North Carolina and in other jurisdictions is in conflict with this recent decision of the Court of Appeals.
Precatory language is that language used by a testator
. . . having the nature of a prayer, request, entreaty; conveying or
2. WILL OF ROSCOE T. TAYLOR, Sa., WILL BK. # 17 at p. 137, ORANGE COUNTY,
NORTH CAROLINA, REGISTER OF DEEDS.

3. Kessing v. Mortgage Corporation, 278 N.C. 523, 180 S.E.2d 823 (1971);
Pridgen v. Hughes, 9 N.C. App. 635, 177 S.E.2d 425 (1970); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-l, Rule 56(b).
4. 21 N.C. App. at 297, 204 S.E.2d at 194.
5. Id. at 298, 204 S.,E.2d at 194.
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TESTATOR'S INTENT
embodying a recommendation or advice or the expression of a wish,
'but not a positive command or direction; employed in wills, as distinguished from direct or imperative terms.6
This definition is quite general and imports little more than a direction,
that when "words of art" usually deemed to be precatory are used by
a testator, the intent of the testator does not command that a certain
thing be done, but only that there be a moral or ethical obligation
placed upon the devisee or legatee under the will. Thus, there is no
legal mandate that the devisee or legatee take a specific mode of action.
In a vintage North Carolina case, Hardy v. Hardy,7 the plaintiff
brought an action to recover the purchase money for property sold to
the defendant, who refused to accept the deed to the property contending that the title to the property was not marketable. The defendant
grounded his refusal of the deed based upon a provision in a will in
which the plaintiff was a devisee. The provision stated
It is my last wish and desire that my old home shall remain intact as
it now stands and that my son . . .shall eventually own it by buying

his sister's interests as set out above by all of them coming to a mutual agreement. 8
The North Carolina Supreme Court held the plaintiff's title marketable
and ordered the defendant to pay the agreed purchase price. The
court then enunciated its position concerning the use of precatory words
and phrases, which is presently followed by a majority of the jurisdictions.
Under the early English and American authorities, language in a will,
expressive of the wish or desire of the testator as to .the disposition of
his property, was generally held to raise a trust, or limit the estate devised, unless a contrary intent was manifest from a consideration of the
whole will; but the tendency of modem authority is to reverse this
rule, and to hold that precatory words are not to -be regarded as imperative unless -it is plain from the context that the testator intended
them. 9
Precatory words are not in and of themselves words of legal mandate
when used in wills and do not place a legal obligation upon a devisee
or a legatee unless such is the command of the testator.'" In Hardy,
this concept was plumbed with sufficient clarity. 1
In a subsequent decision, Springs v. Springs,' 2 the testator devised
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONA Y 1340 (4th ed. revised, 1968).

174 N.C. 505, 93 S.E. 976 (1917).
Id. at 506, 93 S.E. at 977.
Id. at 506, 93 S.E. at 977.
Rouse v. Kennedy, 260 N.C. 152, 132 S.E.2d 308 (1963).
174 N.C. 505, 93 S.E. 976.
182 N.C. 484, 109 S.E. 839 (1921).
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To my sister Alice; When you are made acquainted with the contents
of this will it is my wish that you make a will immediately and leave
all of your property to our nephew John M. Springs. Should you
marry afterward you can tear up the will. My object is to have my
property given to you first, but should you die 13without children, I
wish you to leave your property to Johnny Springs.
The testatrix used the word of art "wish" within the provision of her will,
and the court held that the word "wish" used in this context did not
place an obligatory burden upon the devisee. The testatrix did not
command that the same be done. Had the testatrix specifically mandated that the devisee prepare a will and leave the property in question
to Mr. Springs, then the testatrix could have provided that the property
"shall go" to that particular individual.' 4 Yet, there was no legal obligation placed on Alice to act in accordance with the testatrix's wishes
and desires, because the words of art she used in the context of the
provision and the entire will were to be construed in light of their precatory nature. Had the testatrix reorganized her thoughts and her expressions to be obligatory, she would have succinctly commanded the
same in her will without the use of the terms "wish" or "desire". Thus
the court has framed its opinion to conform with the concept that a testator does not express in mandatory language that which he does not
perforce command.
In a more recent decision, Andrew v. Hughes,'5 the plaintiff brought
an action to enforce a trust in lands devised by the will of Charles F.
Fox. The testator's provision read as follows:
I will and devise to my beloved wife . . . all of my real estate that I
may own at the time of my death to have and to hold during the term
of her natural life, and at her death I will and devise that Clatie Andrew, my trsuted niece, shall have all of my real estate. . .and I do
hereby give and devise to my wife, -the remainder of all of my real
estate not hereinafter devised, to her, her heirs, and assigns in fee
simple forever. I do this because I want my sister to have the benefit
of said land, if she is living fter th death of m wife -A if not
then her children will get the benefit and I want my niece . . to have
full control of said land and use it as she may see fit for her mother,
brother, sisters, herself, or any other relative, and that is why I am
devising it to Clatie Andrew in fee simple. ...."
It is clear that the will in Andrew provided for an absolute and unconditional fee simple devise to Clatie Andrew. The words of art that followed this devise were expressive of suggestion not mandate, and they
13. Id. at 485, 109 S.E. at 839.
14. Id. at 486, 109 S.E. at 840.
15. 243 N.C. 616, 91 S.E.2d 591 (1956).

16. Id. at 617, 91 S.E.2d at 592.
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. TESTATOR'S INTENT
were held to be precatory in nature. The devisee was given the ultimate discretion as to the disposition of the property. In the absence
of a command by the testator, there was no legal requirement that the
devisee act in any particular manner. In this type of testamentary trust
situation, courts generally hold that no trust will
arise unless there is
17
specific language that is not precatory in nature.
In such a situation, the testator-settlor generally uses words of art
such as "wish", "desire", "hope" or "request" which, as the various
commentators note, does not require that a trust be created. Had the
testator intended a trust to arise, he would have to use language of a
mandatory nature."8
The primary question in every case is the intention of the testator,
and whether in the use of precatory words he meant merely to advise
or influence the discretion of the devisee or himself -to control or
direct the disposition intended. .. the words "request", "desire, and
the like do not naturally import a legal obligation. .. When it is alleged that precatory words showed an intent to have a trust the
courts consider :the language of the entire instrument and all of its
provisions, and also the situation of the alleged settler ....
19
The facts and circumstances in Crews do not present any question
as to whether the testator intended to create a trust. However, if precatory language is used by a testator in his attempt to dispose of or direct
the use of his property after his death, or to direct a particular devisee
to act in a particular manner, then the legal significance of the precatory language is similar, even if no trust is intended by the testator.
Moreover, the general thrust of North Carolina case law follows this
line of reasoning.2 0
In another North Carolina decision, Rouse v. Kennedy,2 the testator
used this language "it is my express wish an desire"2 2 that certain farmlands owned by the testator be sold first to provide the necessary funds
to carry-out the provisions of a testamentary trust created in the will.
The trustee in Rouse was vested with broad managerial powers including the power to make dispositions of the property if he so decided.
The question presented was whether or not the testator's language in
vesting such powers in the trustee commanded the trustee to follow his
chronological scheme for the disposition of his property. The court
cited Hardy, and ample secondary authority23 in stating that
17.

BOrERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

260 N.C. 152, 132 S.E.2d 308.
Supra, note 17.
174 N.C. at 506, 93 S.E. at 977.
260 N.C. 152, 132 S.E.2d 308.
Id. at 153-54, 132 S.E.2d at 310.
54 AM. JUR., TRusTs, § 55, at 65.

at 28, § 19 (4th ed. 1963).
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. . precatory words are presumably indicative of no more than a request or an expectation, and do not create a trust -unless the context
of the surrounding circumstances at the time of -the making of the
trust instrument show that the testator, although he used the language
of request, really meant to leave the trustee no option in the matter
24

Thus, from the language in this opinion, and from the above-cited
cases, it must be concluded that words which the court commonly defines as precatory, such as "wish", "desire" or "request", cannot simply
be extracted from their testamentary encampment, be labelled as precatory, and then be deemed only as morally obliging. To do such would
dislodge the cohesive quality of every will by merely extracting provisions solely for their precatory nature and effect. Consequently, it is
incumbent upon a court not only to examine the particular words used
by the testator, but also to scrutinize the clause in which the words appear and to survey the four corners of the entire will and the circumstances surrounding its creation when there is an ambiguity in the testamentary intentions of the testator or testatrix.25
Often a testator devises property to a particular devisee in fee simple,
and then later in the will he imposes some restriction as to the free
alienation of the property originally devised. The question which arises
in this frequent type of situation, is whether the devisee is the fee owner
of the property or whether there is a legal obligation placed upon him
to act in accordance with the delimiting directions of the testator. The
North Carolina Supreme Court has held that the devisee need not follow the expressions later directed to the devisee when the language
used by the testator following the absolute devise is precatory.26 This
principle has been codified in the North Carolina General Statutes to
cover several particular situations.2 7
Words and phrases such as "I want my house and lot sold, the money
to be put in the bank to go to Robert L. Christmas, and used for his
education" is not precatory, but clearly mandatory pursuant to the testator's testamentary command. 28 "I want" imports an unconditional
imperative upon the one to whom the command is directed, and is not.
precatory language.2 9 There is a difference in testamentary construction among "I want" and "I desire" or "I direct" and "I request".
24. 260 N.C. at 157, 132 S.E.2d at 311.
25. YMCA v. Morgan, 281 N.C. 485, 189 S.E.2d 169 (1972); Bank v. Home for
Children, 280 N.C. 354, 185 S.E.2d 336 (1972); 7 STRONG'S NORTH CAROLINA INDEX
2d, Wills, § 28, at 595-98.
26. Quickel v. Quickel, 261 N.C. 696, 136 S.E.2d 52 (1964).
27. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31-38 (1973).
28. Laws v. Christmas, 178 N.C. 359, 100 S.E. 587 (1919).
29. Anders v. Anderson, 246 N.C. 53, 97 S.E.2d 415 (1957).
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TESTATOR'S INTENT
Although a cohesive holding in Crews required the court's construc-

tion of "desire" in the context of the will,80 the court overlooked the
circumstances surrounding the creation of that instrument. The appellant was the son of the testator, and in an early provision of the will
the testator devised a fee simple title in one-third of his real property
to the appellant. 8 ' The testator expressly directed that after his wife's
death such property vest in the parties to this action in fee simple. In
the fourth item of the will is framed the word "desire", directed towards
the appellant and to no one else. "Desire," standing alone, is construed as a precatory word. However, it must be remembered, that
the law regarding precatory words and phrases and their application
must not be arbitrary. Thus, the court must look to the entire instrument and the circumstances surrounding its creation for guidance when
such patent ambiguities appear. Simply labelling a word as precatory
without interpreting the entire instrument is at best both arbitrary and
illusory.3 2 Yet it was just this type of arbitrariness which permeated
the opinion of the Court of Appeals and undermined the well-established principle that a testator does not make mandatory that which he
does not command.
Considering the will in its entirety, it seems that he wished item 4 to
'be imperative rather than precatory; and therefore, the monies advanced to the petitioner [appellant] must be accounted -for before the
we
property is partitioned . . . Under the circumstances of this will,
3
think it is clear that the testator intended them to be mandatory.
Ultimately, the Court of Appeals reversed the lower court judgment,
only because the trial court granted summary judgment for the respondent on its own motion. Counsel for the appellant attempted to
graphically illustrate the linguistic and grammatical diagram of Item
Fourth in order to illustrate to the court that the word "desire" pervaded the entire provision, and that the precatory nature of the provision did not legally oblige the appellant to re-pay the advancement.
However, the court concluded that the property of the testator could
not be partitioned until the appellant accounted to the testator's estate
for the purported five-thousand dollar lifetime advancement.
Testamentary intention is the polar star which must guide the inter30. 21 N.C. App. 296, 204 S.E.2d 193.
31. WILL OF RoscoE T. TAYLOR, SR.,

WILL B.

#

17 at 137,

ORANGE COUNTY,

NORTH CAROLINA, REGISTER OF DEEDS:

SECOND: To my beloved wife, Nora Wagner Taylor, I give, devise and bequeath all of my real estate to be hers for and during the term of her natural life.
Upon the death of my beloved wife, I give, devise and bequeath my real estate to
my children, to wit: Thomas Taylor, Sue Taylor Crews, and Roscoe T.
Taylor, Jr., share and share alike in fee simple.
32. 261 N.C. 696, 136 S.E.2d 52.
33. 21 N.C. App. at 298, 204 S.E.2d at 195.
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pretation. of all wills; and when it is ascertained, such intent will be
given effect unless it is law-violative or contrary to public policy. 4 The
testamentary intention is derived from the words and phrases utilized
by the testator in-constructing his will."' It appears that the North Carolina Court of Appeals' resolution of the problem of the patent ambiguity in the testator's use -of the word "desire", coupled with the facts
and circumstances surrounding the creation of the will was clearly erroneous. Such error is reflected in the courts' finding that the "desire"
of the testator meant that the appellant was required to account to the
testator's estate. Enlightened case precedent outside of North Carolina
flatly rejects the decision of the North Carolina court.
In a recent Washington case, In re Estate of Novolich, 6 the testator
inserted this provision in his last will and testament:
In the event my wife is not living at the time of my death. I recommend that at the -hearing -upon the final account, that the Court partition among the persons, entitled thereto, the estate so that my daughter, Rose S. Griese, receives the land and farm property, and that
my daughter Mary S. Larue, receives other property in lieu thereof
37

The court held that Mrs. Griese was not entitled to the farm property
described by the testator as a matter of right because the use of the
word "recommendation" and of the phrase "I recommend" were
deemed to be precatory and not legally commanding.3 8 The court further noted that
It is axiomatic that the testator's intent is paramount in construing a
will and that such intention must come from the words he uses, construed in their natural and obvious sense.3 9
In a Rhode Island case, Lux v. Lux,4" the testator made a provision
similar to that made by the testator in the Springs case 4 where a chronological sequence couched in precatory phrases recommended the distribution of the testator's bounty. The Rhode Island Supreme Court
held thn t
The. words "express desire" are purely precatory. We have said that
precatory language will be construed as words of command only if
it is clear that the testator intended to impose on the individual concerned a legal obligation to make the desired disposition. We think
it clear -thatsince Philomena's primary goal was to benefit her grand34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Clark v. Connor, 253 N.C. 515, 117 S.E.2d 465.(1960).
Price v. Price, 11 N.C. App. 657, 182 S.E.2d 217 (1971).
7 Wash. App. 495, 500 P.2d 1297 (1972).
Id. at 497, 500 P.2d at 1298.
Id. at 497, 500 P.2d at 1300.
Id. at 500, 500 P.2d at 1300.
109 R.I. 592, 288 A.2d 701 (1972).
182 N.C. 484, 109 S.E. 839.
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children, we see nothing in the record that would justify a conclusion
that she intended that the potential 42
purchasers of her real estate be
limited to the members of her family.
Similar words were used in a will in Kentucky 43 and in Iowa, 44 and
the courts there were completely in accord with the opinion of the
Rhode Island court.
A New York court in the case of In re Martin's Estate45 was presented with a question as to the interpretation of precatory words and
phrases in a testator's last will. There, the testator used the word "request" and the phrase "I request" in designating a particular local Masonic Lodge to be the beneficiary of certain monies from the testator's
residuary estate, should there be any residuary estate after distribution.
The language of the New York court is indicative of how the construction of precatory words and phrases in wills should be resolved when
there is a patent ambiguity in the meaning of such words and phrases.
The principle that a testator does not express in less than mandatory
language anything he does not command was discussed. The court
stated that
In construing the testamentary instrument, we should not -be mesmerized by this single word but rather, mindful of the admonition
that there is no more likely way to misapprehend the meaning of
language, be it a constitution, statute, will or contract, than to read
words literally, for getting the object which the document as a whole
is meant to secure. Although words such as "request", "wish" and
"desire" are ordinarily read as precatory, they will be taken to
connote a 'hope or command depending on whether the author meant
them simply to advise or inform a discretion which is vested in somebody or to direct a certain disposition in question-that is, the persons to take, the subject matter or amount of the gift, its terms and
duration .... 46
This holding appears to be on all fours with those of the courts of Louisiana, 47 Mississippi," and Texas. 9
In a California case, In re Estate of Beauchamp,50 the court held
that when words of recommendation or request are used in direct reference to the disposition of the decedent's estate they are prima facie
42. 109 R.I. at 602, 288 A.2d at 707.
43. Flynn v. Flynn, 469 S.W.2d 886 (1971).
44. In re Estate of Miguet, 185 N.W.2d 508 (1971).
45. 300 N.Y.S.2d 751, 32 N.Y. App. Div. 2d 849 (1969).
46. Id. at 754.
47. Succession of Barnett, 245 So. 2d 418 (1971).
48. Carlisle v. Estate of A.W. Carlisle, 233 So. 2d 803 (1970).
49. Taylor v. Republic National Bank of Dallas, 452 S.W.2d 560 (1970); Woods
v. Wedgeworth, 453 S.W.2d 385 (1970); Everett v. Adams, 444 S.W.2d 789 (1969);
Henry v. Curb, 430 S.W.2d 29 (1968).
50. 64 Cal. Rptr. 340, 256 Cal. App. 2d 563 (1967).
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testamentary and imperative, not precatory. While the desire of a decedent addressed to a devisee is construed as a mere request, case law
generally holds that such an address must be construed as a command
or legal mandate when the language used is addressed to his executor
or his trustee. This principle appears to be the rule in North Carolina
as well. 5 ' Yet, in Crews the Court of Appeals specifically determined
that the word "desire" used in the testator's will was not precatory because of a patent ambiguity in the meaning of the words; and under
the facts and circumstances of the will, more than one interpretation
could be gleaned from the use of this precatory word in Item Fourth
of the will. 2
Conclusion
From the range of authorities cited herein, it is apparent that the
North Carolina Court of Appeals erred in its construction of testamentary words of art when a patent ambiguity arose in a testamentary disposition. It is plausible that the word "desire", and the phrase "I desire" may be subject to several interpretations. However, the North
Carolina court failed to look to the four corners of the instrument and
the facts and circumstances surrounding the creation of the will when
it decided Crews. The case law and precedent from outside this jurisdiction is both persuasive and well-established. The case law in North
Carolina is still in the process of being shaped and formed. In light
of the fact that it has been several years since the court has enunciated
its present position on a testator's use of precatory words and phrases,
it is submitted that the controversy in the Crews case presented a propitious time for an enlightened decision.
Perhaps the Crews case did not present issues of significant importance to the body of case law in North Carolina. However, it appears
that practicing attorneys in North Carolina will now hesitate to prepare
an estate for a client when the client does not want to command certain
actions to devisees and to

Ilgatees,

'ut chooses instead to only morally

oblige that a certain mode of action be taken.
The Court of Appeals failed to look outside the borders of North
Carolina to render a decision which could have clarified the construction of language utilized by attorneys in testamentary dispositions of
property and unfortunately, did not express itself with the crystal clarity
of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, when that court stated
When precatory words are used merely for the purpose of advising or

influencing, or as expressive of a wish or desire that the legatee make
a certain use of the testator's bounty, they are not obligatory upon
51.

261 N.C. 696, 136 S.E.2d 52.

52. See In re Estate of Patterson, 75 Cal. Rptr. 439, 270 Cal. App. 2d 89 (1969).
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TESTATOR'S INTENT
those to whom they are addressed; but when used to express his
manifest intention to control or direct, they are mandatory and will
53
be so construed in saying what effect is to be given to them ....
SAMUEL STUART GOREN

Police Interrogation: Michigan v. Tucker
In the dramatic case of Michigan v. Tucker,' the Supreme Court decided that during an in-custody interrogation of a suspect all the warnings as outlined in the Miranda' decision need not be given. Even
though the interrogation took place prior to Miranda, the Court mandated that an accused be given certain warnings before he is interrogated.
Tucker had been arrested on a charge of rape, and before the interrogation the police advised him that any statement he made could be
used against him at trial. Furthermore, he was advised that he had
a right to remain silent and a right to counsel. However, the police
did not inform him that if he were indigent that counsel would be furnished for him. Respondent told police that he did not want an attorney and that he understood his constitutional rights. Nevertheless,
during the course of the interrogation, Tucker informed the authorities
that he was with a friend and divulged the identity of his alibi [Henderson]. The later statements of Henderson tended to incriminate Tucker
and Henderson stated that respondent was not with him at the -time
of the crime. It is to be remembered that these events preceded Miranda.
Before his trial following the Supreme Court decision in Miranda,
the respondent moved to suppress the expected incriminating testimony
of Henderson; the reason being that the respondent had disclosed Henderson's identity without having received the full warnings required by
Miranda.' The state court denied the motion and permitted Henderson to testify and respondent was convicted at the trial. Respondent
53. In re Estate of Corbett, 430 Pa. 54, at 57-58, 241 A.2d 524 at 525 (1968); see
also, Canal National Bank v. United States, 258 F. Supp. 629 (D.C. Me., 1966); Good
Samaritan Hospital and Medical Center v. United States National Bank of Oregon, 246
Ore. 478, 425 P.2d 541 (1967); Frederick v. Frederick, 355 Mass. 662, 247 N.E.2d 361
(1969).
1. 42 U.S.L.W. 4887 (June 10, 1974).
2. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1964).
3. Miranda was decided by the Supreme Court after the interrogation of Tucker,
but before his trial.
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